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Abstract
Understanding the number of individuals who have been infected with the novel
coronavirus SARS-CoV-2, and the extent to which social distancing policies have been
effective at limiting its spread, are critical for effective policy going forward. Here we
present estimates of the extent to which confirmed cases in the United States under-
count the true number of infections, and analyze how effective social distancing mea-
sures have been at mitigating or suppressing the virus. Our analysis uses a Bayesian
model of COVID-19 fatalities with a likelihood based on an underlying differential
equation model of the epidemic. We provide analysis for four states with significant
epidemics: California, Florida, New York, and Washington. Our short-term forecasts
suggest that these states may be following somewhat different trajectories for growth
of the number of cases and fatalities.
1 Introduction
The coronavirus SARS-CoV-2, which causes the disease COVID-19, has already changed
the lives of billions of people globally. Many people have been ordered to stay in their
homes, and economies worldwide have largely come to a halt. Thousands have died
and at least several million have been infected. In the United States, social distancing
measures began being implemented in mid-March, as states such as Washington, Cal-
ifornia, and New York saw a sharp rise in the number of hospitalizations attributable
to the virus. Government response has been hindered by insufficient supply of mate-
rials needed for testing, and by the large proportion of infected individuals who are
asymptomatic and therefore are unlikely to seek testing even if it is available. This
has made it very difficult to know the true size of the infected population. Because
effective surveillance has not been possible, policymakers have instead turned to social
distancing policies as the only available tool to slow the spread of the virus.
Here, we seek to address two key questions: (1) how many people are actually
infected or have ever been infected with SARS-CoV-2; and (2) Are the social distanc-
ing measures currently in place effective at suppressing the virus – that is, can they
be expected to lead to a decrease in the number of infections. The main challenge
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in performing such an analysis is data availability and quality. Ideally, we could use
data on the number of confirmed cases to understand the prevalence of the disease
and assess policy measures. However, for the reasons outlined above, case counts are
wildly unreliable and mostly reflect the availability of testing and proportion of indi-
viduals who are asymptomatic rather than the actual size of the infected population.
A better data source would be hospitalizations, but even these data are not universally
available across different U.S. states, and in some states, such as California, the policy
is that even hospitalized patients should not be tested unless the outcome of the test
would change the clinical management of the disease. Differences in testing policies for
hospitalized patients across states make these data unreliable. Thus, here we build a
model of the spread of COVID-19 fit only on data that has reasonable chance of being
accurate: data on deaths attributable to COVID-19. Even these data are imperfect.
For example, New York City recently revised its death count upwards by roughly 30
percent by including victims who were COVID-19 suspected but not confirmed. How-
ever, patients with severe disease are the most likely to be tested, and therefore the
death count data are likely the most reliable data source we have that contains any
information about the rate of infection.
Much of the epidemiological literature focuses on fitting or calibrating ordinary dif-
ferential equation (ODE) models to observed data [6], and this underpins our approach
as well. Ideally, these data would be counts of infected and recovered individuals over
time. In order to fit such a model to death data, modifications to the standard ap-
proach must be made. The observed deaths need to be linked to the underlying state
variables of the ODE model via a sensible likelihood. We do this by means of a dis-
tribution for the time from infection to death, and an assumption about the infection
fatality rate (IFR) – the proportion of infected individuals who will eventually die of
COVID-19. We base these values on clinical data from Wuhan, China, the Diamond
Princess cruise ship, and South Korea. Using only death data, these parameters and
the parameters of the underlying ODE model are not separately identifiable. For this
reason, the time to death distribution and IFR are assumptions of our model. There
exist external estimates of the time to death distribution based on high quality data.
For the IFR, precisely because of the difficulty outlined above in establishing the true
number of infections, there remains considerable uncertainty about its true value. Be-
cause the IFR is such an important assumption of our model, we perform analysis for
several values of the IFR. Conditional on these assumptions and a sampling model for
deaths given infections, we fit the parameters of an underlying ODE model of epidemic
dynamics to the observed death data.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we review related
work. In section 3 we introduce our model and explain how the model can be used to
infer the number of infections and the effect of social distancing measures. In section
4 we describe an MCMC algorithm for fitting our model. In section 5 we give results.
Section 6 concludes and offers some insight on policy options.
2
2 Related Work
Several previous studies have attempted to model the dynamics of the pandemic in var-
ious geographical locations, with varying goals. Several of these studies have provided
some analysis or estimate of the amount by which confirmed cases undercount the true
number of infections. For example, Li et al. [10] propose that in the first month of the
epidemic in China, 82-90 percent of infections were undocumented. Riou et al. [14]
use a SEIR model, an epidemiological ODE model, and calibrate their model to the
time series of reported deaths and reported infections. By modeling the underreport-
ing of symptomatic cases, and by assuming that approximately half of infections lead
to symptomatic cases, they estimate the infected population in Hubei, finding that
approximately 30% of infections were documented. Perkins et al. [12] estimate directly
that in the US, more than 90% of infections have been undocumented by tests using
Chinese data and initial reports in the US.
Ferguson et al. [3] model the effect of transmission between susceptible and infec-
tious individuals using a microsimulation model built on synthetic populations designed
to mimic the populations of the United Kingdom and United States. They assume a
fixed time-to-onset and a range of R0 values from 2.0-2.6, and they assume symp-
tomatic cases to be 50% more infectious than asymptomatic cases. Having calibrated
their model to the cumulative number of deaths, they estimate deaths and hospital
loads under different non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPI) involving social distanc-
ing and isolation. This analysis was arguably the most influential in triggering the
adoption of social distancing policies in the United States, as it indicated that without
social distancing measures in place, there would likely be around 2.2 million deaths,
and hospitals nationwide would be completely overwhelmed. They also predicted that
social distancing measures could reduce the number of deaths substantially and pre-
vent exceedance of hospital resources, but only if they were dynamically turned “on
and off” by triggering mechanisms based on the current number of COVID-19 patients.
The report envisioned social distancing remaining in place for roughly 18 months until
a vaccine is likely to be available.
The CHIME app [16] is an online tool created by researchers at the University of
Pennsylvania to help hospitals anticipate the number of incoming COVID-19 patients
and their needs. The CHIME model uses the current number of COVID-19 hospitaliza-
tions to “back out” the total number of cases based on a user provided hospitalization
rate conditional on infection. Similar to our work, their model does not rely on the
case counts. They make forward projections for the number of hospital admissions,
ICU admissions, and ventilators needed over the coming weeks. They allow the user
to specify the parameters of their underlying epidemiological model as inputs in terms
of the doubling time for the infected population.
The model given in Murray [11] has a goal similar to CHIME (hospital use plan-
ning). This model (the IHME model) takes a different approach by fitting parametric
curves to observed cumulative death rates. They use a hierarchical model on the pa-
rameters of the parametric curve. The model essentially projects that the future course
of the cumulative death rate curve in the United States will follow a path similar to
that observed in other locations that are farther along in the course of their epidemics.
There is no underlying model of epidemic dynamics, but there is a sampling model
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for death rates, which allows them to give confidence intervals. The New York Times
online tool allows the user to specify inputs to understand how those inputs affect
likely infections, hospital loads, and deaths; infections are a side-effect of the rest of
the model.
The recent work of Flaxman et al. [4] takes a similar approach to ours to evaluate the
effect of social distancing orders across countries in Europe. They define a likelihood
for death-only data and incorporate mitigation efforts in the model. They build a
hierarchical model to estimate the number of infections and effects of mitigation across
countries in Europe. This work is the most closely related to ours, and the overall
approach is quite similar, but their analysis is done for Europe whereas here we consider
only the United States. Lewnard et al. [8] also evaluates the effect of mitigation efforts.
They observe reductions in estimates of the effective reproduction number for patients
in three hospital systems in Northern California, Southern California, and Washington
State as a consequence of the implementation of non-pharmaceutical interventions, like
social distancing.
3 Model
Let νt be the number of new infections on day t of the epidemic, and let p denote the
infection fatality rate, i.e. the probability of death given infection. We denote the day
of the first infection by T0. Let θ “ tθs : s “ 0, 1, ....,mu be the set of probabilities
defining the discrete time-to-death distribution, where θs denote the probability that,
for those who die, death from COVID-19 occurs s days after the initial infection. Let
Xpt, t1q denote the number of individuals newly infected on day t who die on day t1.
Our death model is
Xpt, t1q | p, θ „ Poissonppνtθpt1´tqq.
The observed deaths on day r are thus given by
Dprq “
rÿ
t“1
Xpt, rq,
the sum over all previous days of the number of individuals infected on that day who
went on to die on day r. This has marginal distribution
Dprq „ Poisson
˜
p
rÿ
t“1
νtθpr´tq
¸
. (1)
This equation defines our likelihood. The use of a Poisson distribution in spec-
ifying our model may seem unnatural compared to the specification Xpt, t1q | p, θ „
Binomialpνt, pθpt´t1qq. The Poisson specification allows νt to take real values as opposed
to integer values, as would be required for a Binomial distribution. This allows us to
use simpler, deterministic models for the underlying epidemiological curves defining
the νts, which simplifies computation. Fortunately in cases where pθs is small and ν is
large (precisely the situation in which we find ourselves after the very early days of the
epidemic), the Poissonppθsνq distribution is a good approximation to Binomialpν, pθsq.
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The observed number of deaths D are linked to a compartmental epidemiological
model via the total number of newly infected individuals on day t, νt. We use an SIR
model of epidemic dynamics, with state evolution given by the following ODE
BSt
Bt “
#
´βStItN´1 t ă T1
´φβStItN´1 t ě T1 (2)
BIt
Bt “
#
βStItN
´1 ´ γIt t ă T1
φβStItN
´1 ´ γIt t ě T1
BRt
Bt “ γIt,
where St is the number of susceptible individuals at time t, It is the number of infected
individuals at time t, N is the total population size, Rt is the number of removed (re-
covered or deceased) individuals at time t, and T1 is the time at which social distancing
went into effect. This set of equations defines a Susceptible-Infected-Removed (SIR)
model. Prior to mitigation policies, it is a standard SIR model with parameters tβ, γu;
post-mitigation, it takes parameters tφβ, γu. 1-φ represents the percent reduction in
the rate of infection that occurred following implementation of mitigation policies.
In a SIR model with parameters tβ, γu, infected individuals are considered conta-
gious, and the mean time between infection and removal (the end of the contagious
period) is given by γ´1. R0 is given by βγ´1 – this is the number people who are
infected by a single infected individual in a population in which essentially everyone is
susceptible. The νt variables on which our likelihood is conditioned can be extracted
directly from this model. The number of new infections that occurred during day t is
simply the difference in the size of the S compartment at time t and t ` 1. This is
because under this model, individuals may only leave the susceptible compartment by
becoming infected, so the new number of infections that occurred in any time period
is precisely the reduction in the number susceptible in that same period.
Figure 1 shows one realization of our modified SIR model. The top panel shows
one draw of the daily number of deaths. Notice that this is not a smooth curve. When
fitting our model, these Ds will be our data, and will be the only thing we observe
directly. The other panels are what we will infer from the Ds. The middle panel of the
figure shows the νs, the number of daily new infections. The series of Ds has roughly
the same shape as the νs, though it lags it by about 25 days. This lag is due to the
shape of the time from infection to death distribution θ, which we describe below. The
bottom panel gives the standard view of the SIR model, showing the total number of
susceptible, infected, and removed at any given time point.
Due to identifiability constraints, we do not estimate all of parameters of the model.
Rather, we fix those for which there exists high quality information on reasonable
values that is applicable in the context studied here. By and large, this includes those
parameters pertaining more to the biology of the disease than to the social dynamics
of its spread.1 These include θ and p.
1It is impossible to make a clean distinction between these two types of parameters. For example,
if the rate of spread allows for the number of people requiring care to overwhelm existing healthcare
infrastructures, the case fatality rate will increase, as those who require medical support to survive but
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Figure 1: One realization of our modified SIR models
For θ, we draw from two studies. Zhou et al. [18] reports that in Wuhan, China, the
time from symptom onset to death had a median time of 18.5 days with an interquartile
range of 15 to 22 days. A Poisson-Gamma distribution with parameters tα, βu “
t27.75, 1.5umatches the reported quantiles well. Lauer et al. [7] estimate the incubation
period of the disease, also using data from China. They report a median incubation
time of 5.1 days with an estimated 97.5th percentile of 11.5 days and a 99th percentile
of 14 days. The quantiles of a Poisson-Gamma distribution with parameters tα, βu “
t5.5, 1.1u match these reported quantiles well. We calculate the distribution of the
total time from infection to death by generating 100,000 samples from the described
distribution of the incubation period and the described distribution of the time from
symptom onset to death. The time to death is the sum of these two numbers. We
truncate the maximum time to death from infection to be the 99th percentile of the
generated samples. This results in a time to death distribution shown in Figure 2.
To set p we rely on several external data points. Russell et al. [15] use data from
individuals on the Diamond Princess cruise ship to estimate an infection fatality rate of
1.2% (95% CI: 0.38%-2.7%) after adjusting for delays between infection confirmation
and death. The ship was a closed population: we know who was on the ship and
therefore who to test, so we have confidence in the denominator (all individuals infected
with COVID-19 were identified because all people on the ship could be tested). It is
possible that some negative tests were false negatives, which would lower the estimate
of the infection fatality rate by increasing the denominator. The tests used for these
individuals were based on quantitative polymerase chain reaction (qPCR), which has
cannot get it will die.
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Figure 2: Conditional on death occurring, the probability of death on each day following
infection.
a much higher potential for false negatives than for false positives, so we do not expect
false positives were a significant factor in these estimates.
Another external information source is reported case fatality rates in countries
that have done aggressive testing and contact tracing, including testing asymptomatic
individuals. In these places, the case numbers may approach the true number of
infections, so case fatality information in these locations provide a reasonably tight
upper bound on infection fatality rates. Here, we look to South Korea, which has done
the most testing per capita. As of 25 March 2020 there were 9,137 confirmed positive
cases and 126 deaths in South Korea.2 This gives a crude case fatality rate of 1.4%. [1]
use a method for adjusting crude case fatality rates to account for the fact that some
open cases may still result in death. They estimate an adjusted case fatality rate in
South Korea of about 0.29 %.
Finally, [10] estimates the total size of the infected population during the epidemic
in China . Their estimates of the total number of infected implies an adjusted infection
fatality rate of about 0.4 percent (see the note between Li et al. (2020) co-author J.
Shaman here). [17] estimate a symptomatic case fatality of 1.4% in Wuhan, China.
Because not all cases are symptomatic, this implies a lower IFR.
In each of these cases, differences in underlying demographics, comorbities, and
other risk factors could limit the applicability of these estimates to the United States
at large. However, such factors are difficult to adjust for, since data on risk factors
is preliminary and limited. We believe that the comparison is still useful in providing
a range of rough ballpark estimates. Thus, consistent with all of these estimates,
and because the infection fatality rate is arguably the most important parameter in
our model that cannot be learned from the data, we consider three different cases
that cover the spectrum of proposed values: 0.5 percent, 1.0 percent, and 1.5 percent,
2https://www.cdc.go.kr/board/board.es?mid=a30402000000&bid=0030
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though we focus on the 1.0 percent case in some figures.
The parameters we estimate in our model are γr, β, and T0. We base our prior
on the infectious period on previously published studies. Ferguson et al. [3] give a
mean generation time (γ´1 in the SIR model) of 6.4 days; Prem et al. [13] assume an
infectious period of 3 or 7 days in their simulations with an incubation period of about
6 days. While these aren’t directly comparable due to differences in the model, we use
these as rough guidance. We choose the prior γ´1 „ Nr3.4,9.4sp6.4, 1.5q, a truncated
normal distribution corresponding to an infectious period that ranges from about 3
to 9 days. This is a fairly tight prior, consistent with other models for this disease.
To set the prior on β | γ, we use the reported 95 percent confidence interval in [9] to
establish rough upper and lower bounds on the R0, and put β | γ „ Nrγ,4γsp2.5γ, 1.5γq,
encompassing possible R0 values of between 1 and 4 for all of the allowed values of γ.
We place a uniform prior on T0 between 1 January and 20 February. We also place a
Uniform(0.01,0.99) prior on φ allowing it to encompass the possibility that mitigation
policies almost completely stopped the spread of the disease (φ « 0) and that the
policy led to no reduction at all (φ « 1). This prior rules out the possibility that the
mitigation policies, in fact, increased R0.
4 Computation
We do computation by MCMC using the adaptive Metropolis algorithm (see [5]). The
algorithm produces samples from the Bayesian posterior distribution of the parameters
of our model, η “ tβ, γ, T0, φu. Specifically, we update η by proposing a new set of
parameters, η˚ from Npη,Σq, with the time-inhomogeneous covariance Σ computed
using the method of [5]. We then calculate the set of νt˚ s implied by η
˚ by simulating
from the SIR model. We accept or reject the proposed η˚ using Metropolis-Hastings,
with target density proportional to
`pνpηq, ηq “
Tÿ
t“1
ppDptq | νq ` logppipηqq, (3)
where ppDptq | νq is the Poisson probability mass function implied by (1), and pipq
represents the prior density. Notice that because ν is a deterministic function of η,
both terms in (3) depend on the values of these parameters.
We run for 50,000 iterations (100,000 for the state of New York), begin adapta-
tion after 10,000 iterations (20,000 for New York), and use 25,000 iterations of burn-in
(50,000 for New York). Trace plots are shown in the appendix. R code for all of the
analysis here is available at https://github.com/jamesjohndrow/Covid19-modeling.
5 Results
We fit our model to the daily number of deaths for several states in the United States:
California, Florida, New York, and Washington. We use the state-level data compiled
by the New York Times.3. The last date in our data is 17 April 2020. We take the
3https://github.com/nytimes/covid-19-data
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date of implementation of social distancing to be the first day on which restaurants
and schools were both closed statewide, as recorded in a GitHub repository maintained
by researchers at the University of Washington4. This definition is of course somewhat
arbitrary, but given limitations of the available data, it is difficult to conceive of a richer
model that would allow the effects of social distancing to phase in gradually without
making similarly strong assumptions about how much each type of measure is “worth”
compared to the eventual statewide lockdowns that were implemented everywhere.
Figure 3 shows model fit for each of the states for p “ 0.01. The gray bands
show point-wise 95% posterior predictive intervals; the black line shows the values in
our data. Despite the low-dimensionality of the free parameters in our model, our
model fits the data reasonably well. Occasionally, the true values stray outside of
the intervals. This suggests that perhaps a negative binomial or other over-dispersed
count distribution be considered for future models, though of course one expects to
occasionally see values outside of a pointwise 95% interval. We also believe that some
of the extreme deviations from the trend of the model are recording artifacts. For
example, the large spike immediately followed by a dip in deaths evident in the New
York figure in early April does not appear in data provided by the city of New York 5.
In fact, during the time period in which the unexpectedly low count occurs at about
280 in our data, New York City alone recorded nearly 400 deaths. It may be the
case that some of the deaths allocated to the previous day in our data, where we see
an unexpectedly large count, actually occurred on the following day, where our data
have a surprisingly low count. This smoother New York City data, however, does not
include state-wide counts, making it unsuitable for our state-level analysis. For the
sake of consistency and replicability, we use the same data source for all states.
Table 5 shows posterior means and 95% posterior credible intervals of pre-intervention
R0 for each state and for all considered values of p. These estimates are not especially
sensitive to p (good news since this is the parameter about which we are most uncer-
tain), and all fall within the range between about 1.7 and 2.5.
CA FL NY WA
0.005 2.29 (1.76,2.87) 2.29 (1.77,2.91) 2.52 (2.21,3.18) 1.73 (1.49,2.17)
0.01 2.26 (1.73,2.92) 2.27 (1.75,2.91) 2.51 (2.19,3.23) 1.70 (1.46,2.11)
0.015 2.28 (1.75,2.85) 2.30 (1.77,2.89) 2.49 (2.19,3.12) 1.68 (1.43,2.06)
Table 1: Estimated posterior mean of R0, with 95 percent posterior credible interval shown
in parentheses
One quantity estimated by our model is the cumulative number of SARS-CoV-2
infections over time. Comparing these estimates with the reported number of confirmed
cases by state allows us to estimate the extent by which confirmed cases of COVID-19
undercount the number of infections. We define the undercount at each time point to
be our estimated number of cumulative infections as of that time point divided by the
cumulative number of confirmed cases at that time. That it, the undercount is the
multiplicative factor by which the recorded number of confirmed cases under-estimates
4https://github.com/COVID19StatePolicy/SocialDistancing
5see the “Daily Counts” chart here: https://www1.nyc.gov/site/doh/covid/covid-19-data.page
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Figure 3: Posterior predictive analysis for the trajectory of deaths in California, Florida,
New York, and Washington. 95% pointwise posterior predictive intervals shown in gray.
Data is shown in black.
the true number. Figure 4 shows the undercount for each state across time. Naturally,
when p is smaller, and therefore the number of deaths is a smaller proportion of the
true number of infections, we estimate the undercount to be greater. Under the range
of values for p considered, we find that the undercount was somewhere between 10 and
60-fold across states as of early April. This is similar to the estimate of 50-85 fold in
early April obtained by Bendavid et al. [2], which was specific to Santa Clara county,
California. As testing has increased, the undercount factor has reduced to around five
to 25. Table 2 shows the undercount and associated 95% posterior credible intervals
as of the last day that appears in our data, 17 April 2020.
Social distancing policies began coming into effect in parts of the United States
around 15 March, and thus as of April 21, 2020, enough time has now passed since
the implementation of social distancing in at least some states that the effects will be
visible in the deaths data. Recalling the time from infection to death distribution from
Figure 2, changes in the dynamics of new infections should begin to be visible in death
data around two weeks following the onset of the policy change, and should be mostly
visible by around four weeks. This makes right now an appropriate time to attempt to
10
Figure 4: Estimates of the undercount factor for each state by day.
CA FL NY WA
0.005 31.54 (25.38,38.74) 18.48 (13.69,24.39) 18.86 (17.76,20.45) 13.38 (11.83,15.24)
0.01 15.70 (12.85,18.92) 9.41 (6.85,12.82) 9.67 (9.06,10.58) 6.88 (6.05,7.85)
0.015 10.67 (8.66,12.95) 6.26 (4.60,8.49) 6.49 (6.07,7.07) 4.66 (4.07,5.44)
Table 2: Estimated posterior mean of undercount, with 95 percent posterior credible in-
terval shown in parentheses
estimate the effect of social distancing on infection dynamics. In the SIR model, the
number of infected individuals will grow when the rate of new infections is higher than
the rate of removal and will decrease otherwise. In other words, the rates are equal
when the time derivative of It is zero, i.e.
φβStItN
´1 “ γIt
φβSt
Nγ
“ 1 ” Rt
We thus focus on estimating the quantity Rt as of April 21, 2020. When Rt ą 1, the
number of infected individuals is still growing, while if Rt ă 1, it is declining and the
virus is being suppressed. It is important to note that, because this quantity depends
on the current state of St, which is decreasing in time, it is possible for the current
measures to fail to suppress the virus today yet be sufficient to suppress the virus at
some later time because St will have declined.
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Table 3 shows estimates of the posterior mean of RT1 along with 95 percent posterior
credible intervals. Results are reported for four states and for three values of p: 0.005,
0.01, and 0.015. It is clear that this quantity is not very sensitive to the assumption
about p, which is encouraging since this is the major assumption of our model. Based
on these results, the current measures are probably sufficient to suppress the virus in
New York and Washington, possibly sufficient in Florida, and probably insufficient in
California.
CA FL NY WA
0.005 1.35 (1.18,1.54) 1.14 (0.97,1.34) 0.76 (0.74,0.78) 0.65 (0.54,0.76)
0.01 1.34 (1.17,1.55) 1.16 (0.98,1.37) 0.80 (0.78,0.83) 0.68 (0.56,0.79)
0.015 1.37 (1.19,1.56) 1.16 (0.98,1.38) 0.81 (0.79,0.85) 0.71 (0.58,0.82)
Table 3: Estimated posterior mean of RT1 , with 95 percent posterior credible interval
shown in parentheses
We complement our estimates of Rt with short term forecasts for each state. We
do not produce longer term forecasts because the significant uncertainty regarding the
future course of policy regarding social distancing in each state makes such forecasts
highly uncertain and to some extent misleading; however, we do provide some tentative
analysis about whether whether the current measures have been sufficient to suppress
the spread of the virus and by how much. Three week projections for New York,
California, Washington, and Florida for p “ 0.01 are shown in Figure 5. Gray areas
indicate pointwise 95% posterior predictive intervals. Consistent with the posterior
estimates of RT1 , deaths in New York and Washington are projected to decline from
recent peaks. In California, a slow increase in the number of deaths is predicted by
our model. Florida appears likely to see growth in the number of cases, though this
growth may be very slow, and may appear more like a plateau than obvious growth.
6 Conclusion
We have built a model for the transmission of SARS-CoV-2 using only information
which has a reasonable chance of being measured correctly: the observed number of
daily deaths, timing of containment measures, and information on the clinical progres-
sion of the disease. Even having endeavored to build a model around the best available
information, it is likely that some of this information is imperfect. For example, anec-
dotal reports from New York and elsewhere suggest that not all deaths from COVID-19
are being accurately reported, so even deaths attributable to COVID-19 are likely not
perfectly measured. However, we believe death data to be more accurate than either
cases or hospitalizations, which are not even available for some states. Information on
the clinical progression of the disease, including the infection fatality rate, will likely
improve over time, as more data on this emerging disease becomes available and is
analyzed. Because of the importance of the infection fatality rate in our model and
the substantial uncertainty about its value, we consider three different scenarios which
roughly cover the range of possibilities that have been proposed. Analysis for p “ 0.01
is shown here; detailed analysis of alternative values of p “ 0.005 and p “ 0.015 are
12
Figure 5: History with three week projections based on posterior mean (dark line), with
posterior 95 percent pointwise credible intervals (gray region), based on p “ 0.01.
given in supplementary material.
In contrast to models that use a wider range of information that may be less pre-
cisely measured, we believe the main strengths of our approach are that it minimizes
assumptions and prioritizes simplicity, interpretability, and parameter identifiability.
Our model also has a proper likelihood and is fit to data in the Bayesian paradigm,
rather than relying on ad hoc calibration of model parameters to produce trajectories
resembling the observed data. This allows us to formally account for uncertainty in
all of our estimates via reporting of posterior credible intervals. Finally, our model
is underpinned by an SIR model of infection dynamics to link observed deaths to the
underlying unobserved infections. It would not be difficult with our approach to sub-
stitute some other model in place of the SIR. In particular, any other compartmental
model, such as a Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Removed (SEIR) model could be used,
or the model could be elaborated to incorporate more change points in the parameters
of the compartmental model to account for fine grained policy analysis. However, the
existing data does not seem adequate to burden the model with so many parameters
at this time.
Using our model, we estimate that official case counts substantially undercount of
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the number of infections. This is not a surprise. Despite recent increases in testing
capabilities, our analysis suggests that we continue to undercount the number of in-
fections by a factor of around five to 25. This estimate is, of course, highly dependent
on our assumption about p. Our model also suggests wide variability in the initial
transmissibility of the disease prior to intervention policies as well as wide variability
in the effects of those policies. For example, while our model suggests that New York’s
epidemic has peaked and will continue to see a decrease in the number of deaths, it
indicates that California may not yet have peaked, and in Florida a slow increase in the
number of deaths seems likely. All of these projections are conditioned on the current
policies staying in place and their effects on transmission remaining constant. Tight-
ening or relaxing mitigation policies, or “quarantine fatigue” leading to a decrease in
compliance by the public, would impact the trajectory of the spread, and this is not ac-
counted for in our model. Finally, we are just entering the time period where the effects
of mitigation are becoming visible in the death data. That leaves us effectively with
little data to estimate the impact of the mitigation efforts. This makes our estimates
sensitive to perturbations due to recording errors or delays (perhaps caused by holiday
weekends). As time progresses, the effect of mitigation policies will be observable in
a larger proportion of the death data, improving the reliability of the estimates. We
anticipate updating the analysis as more data become available, and continually work-
ing to enrich the methodology as data quality and availability improves sufficiently to
support more complex modeling.
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A Trace plots
Figure 6 shows representative traceplots of β, γ, and the implied R0 for p “ 0.01 for
New York. Once adaptation begins, the algorithm evidently mixes quite well.
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